Sunday, July 1, 2012

OGADEN: SNM PERSPECTIVE

OPINION] Ogaden: a self-imposed isolation




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Published 07/08/2008 - 6:15 p.m. GMT



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Opinion: By Ismail Ahmed, Dire Dawa



Although Barre’s regime has collapsed like a cardboard castle nearly two decades ago, there is a Somali clan in Eastern Ethiopia that has not yet laid down its arms. For the Ogaden clan, the war is not yet over. The Ogadeni’s erroneous misconceptions that the war is not yet over for the them is akin to the Japanese soldiers of the Second World War, who refused to laid down their arms before they received orders from their superior officers. These Japanese soldiers were hiding in thick jungles in some of the Pacific islands for many years before they were traced out by fishermen who broke the news to their authorities. Although Ogadens are quite different in many aspects from the Second War Japanese soldiers, still the unwavering enmity they harbor against other fellow Somalis in Eastern Ethiopia and Somaliland Republic is something in public domain. They entertain a wrong conception that the non-Ogadens were largely responsible for bringing the Barre’s regime to its knees - the regime that treated them as one of privileged clans in a country where they had no regions of their own.



To understand the root causes of the present deteriorating relationship between the people of the Somaliland and the Ogadens in Ethiopia, one should first try to get some answers for some of the outstanding questions that individuals ask themselves to day:

Why among all Somali speaking nations in East Africa (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia) the Ogaden is the only clan that sees Somaliland as beta noire?

Is declaring war against the peace loving people of Somaliland is the only way forward for the Ogadens to achieve a unilateral secession from Ethiopia without the support of their fellow Somali Ethiopians?

Would the non-Ogadens who make up the majority of Somalis in Ethiopia simply watch idly by, while the Ogadens, led by unilaterally formed Ogaden Liberation Front (ONLF) fuel unprovoked conflicts in the region?



To fully understand the “whys”, we must first look back at the history behind the Ogaden’s current unflinching opposition to Somaliland’s independence. At the height of genocidal campaign against the people of Somaliland in 1988, the Ogaden generals with approval of their sultans signed a secret agreement with government of Siad Barre .According to this agreement, the Ogadens, who formed the bulk of the government’s fighting forces in Somalia would be given a sweeping power to take over the Northwest and Awdal regions, where major cities , such as Hargeisa, Gabiiley, and Boorma are located and where already 35000 had been resettled as refugees. The conditions attached to the permanent resettlement of Ogadens in Somaliland were :if possible, the complete obliteration of the indigenous Somalialnders; and adopting systematical ways of up-rooting the original Somalilanders that would have paved the way for more Ogaden’s occupation, giving greater emphasis on living quarters of the major cities where government sponsored development projects would be created for the new settlers.



The existence of such secret agreement has been officially confirmed by Somalia’s former defense minister, General Aden Gabyow, who delivered a keynote speech at a public gathering in Hargiesa in July, 1988, after the SNM forces retreated to the adjacent highlands.



At rally marking the “Absamization” of the Issaq-land, held in Hargeisa, General Aden Gobyow delivered the following speech which was kept in the secret archives of Somali TV before it was ransacked during the fighting that ousted Siad Barre:

“Today marks the end of thousands of years in which this land belonged to the Idoors (Issaqs). Some people are luckier than others. We, Absame, as the heroic sons of Darood, must congratulate each other as the luckiest people on earth, for taking over permanently such splendid cities as own properties, for Issaqs would never come back to re-take them again. I saw petty scuffles over the ownership of some abandoned buildings and other properties left behind by fleeing Idoors. You congratulate those whose lucky gave them those better buildings than others. History is in the making. It is a dream that come true. Yesterday, we were taking alms as homeless refugees in the same city that we own today. Those who once owned this city have become hapless refugees in foreign countries.”

In a colorful military outfit, the former member of Waber Artist, Mohamed Abdullahi Sangub blessed the ceremony with a recitation of poem. The ceremony, marking the eviction of Issaqs from their homeland ended in chorus of yaps and yelps, punctuated with abracadabra of traditional Ogaden songs known as Hirwo.Sangub, who was promoted to the rank of a major for mobilizing his clan against the Hargeisan has been ostracized by the rest of Somali societies everywhere, after a court in Minnesota, USA found him guilty of molesting a small refugee girl in 2005.Nothing is more humiliating than a septuagenarian grandfather found guilty of raping a small refugee girl, whom he baited with sugar candies. What a shame! Shame upon him! He fell from grace.

A week after he spoke at rally in Hargeisa in front of Somali TV Camera that would be judged by the next Somali generations , General Aden Gabyow gave a similar interview to the Italian RAI Television, which till today remained intact as it is being preserved in its achieves.



General Gabow was not alone in unveiling publicly an agreement that was hitherto kept secret from the public for many years.

General Abddulkadir was one of the most feared extremist elements in Barre’s government. During the last days of the regime, he emerged as one of the unflinching diehard officials who fought tooth and nail to keep in power a family based dynasty, despite the fact that the security situation was at stake as the combined forces of USC/SNM forces were visible everywhere in the country. He travelled the width and breath to the regions controlled by the government forces to mobilize, mainly the Darood people against what he called the “anti-revolutionary forces”.



Birg.Gen.Abdulkadir Haji Mohamed, (Inna Massaleh), Deputy Chairman of SSRP was sent to Bassaso by General Barre, to immediately mediate Dashishle and Osman Mohamud of Majeerteen, who fought over resources early in 1989. Speaking pompously to a group of elders from both sides in Bassaso as Barre’s special envoy, he delivered the following speech, as Abdirahman Aden’s TV Camera rolled:

“First of all, I would like to convey to you a special message from our beloved leader, who was stunned by such senseless and unnecessary fighting between two Darood sub-clans, at the time when other Daroods were celebrating a historic victory over Issaqs.The timing of such fighting is a great concern for every one of us. Such fighting contravenes the road map that we laid for the Daroodization of all productive regions in the country, which, according to our expectation will inexorably yield fruits that every one of us will enjoy soon.



But, we are desperately in need of a strong and united Darood community that seriously and relentlessly safeguards the achievements of our glorious revolution. Needless to say, today, we are suffering from severe shortages of highly skilled manpower in the regions that we have already Daroodized in the north of the country. Conquering a country is so easy, but effectively keeping it, has proved immense difficulties. But we succeeded in uniting our people against the anti-revolutionaries as much as we differ on certain issues. We have a common interest that binds us all together. In this regard, our unity remained stronger than ever.



In this juncture, I would like to give you a brief account of what the government has done for its Darood people. Hey! Just look at the barren sunburned rocks that encompassed your districts from vertical horizon. The prospect of raising families in the near future in such an unproductive and sun-scorched hostile environment is dim. For your future overall developments, we made relentless efforts since the inception of our revolution. We, as active members of the government are responsible for taking over the most productive agricultural areas in the Lower Shabeele Region, where thousands have now become rich landowners of what once used to be the Italian “Azendas” (banana plantations). These Darood individuals have become rich through the long-term bank loans which most of them have been written off by the beloved president. We have resettled in the country more than five hundred thousand Ogadenis under the pretext of refugees. Those Ogadenis are now actively serving in the forefront to secure the lands that have been already “Daroodized”. We made diversification of funds from other sectors to build long asphalt roads; a modern harbor, water supply and electricity here in Bassaso.The Daroodization policy has worked so fast even beyond our expectation. But to our dismay, you are at one another’s throat, fighting for meager local resources that had already evaporated. It took us all by surprise that those who were supposed to safeguard the achievements of our glorious revolution were locked in a senseless fighting and petty squabbles over minute issues. Have your imagination as mentally grown up men! For Jaalle Siyaad (comrade), nothing is more worrying him than your recent fighting. Now, I would like to witness your immediate renouncement of any further hostilities with oath taking ceremony by shaking hands as our traditional way of burying the hatchet. Mind you, the fate of our Darood nation would be sealed in blood.”



Abdulakdir Massal’s speech reflected the official policy of the government of the day. The government that was supposed to preserve the national unity was instead mobilizing its forces for the destruction of a large section of its population that it pilloried as subordinates and vassals whose regions and properties should be taken by its devotee loyal subjects.



The air force pilot who crashed-landed his Mig-17 fighter on Djibouti beach in 1988, after he consciously defied his superior’s orders to bomb indiscriminately the unarmed civilian population in Hargeisa, has told a horrifying story.

Replying to questions put to him by local reporters as why he defied his superiors’ orders to destroy Haregisa with Russian made deadly 500 fab bombs, Flight Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmed Mohamed Hassan said:

"Another Somali pilot and I were given orders to fly our Mig-17 jet fighters to Hargeisa to undertake intensive aerial bombardments of the city. Already there were air force technicians in Hargiesa, but both of us were given specific assignments to fly to Hargeisa in order to carry out many sorties of aerial bombardments with aim of killing as many civilians as we could. The Mig-17 jets were the only planes in the Somalia air force that could carry the heavy 500 kilo bombs known as “Fab” to cause maximum devastations. Unfortunately, this was a sad chapter in my life and in our history. Remembering the devastations caused by aerial and ground bombardments, personally, I still feel the pain, but it is an issue that has to be discussed in depth by Somalis for many years to come.



Col.Ahmed Dheere, who was on a private visit to Hargeisa in June, 2008, the city he left in 1988 with his Mig-17 fighter jet, now lives with his family in Luxembourg as that country’s naturalized citizen. He received a hero’s welcome in Haregisa.

Asked the difference between now and then, he said, “I left a city in ruins, and I returned back to a sprawling modern city.”



The bold decision taken by Lt.Colonel Ahmed Mohamed Hassan has encouraged other Somalis, particularly; those in Mogadishu and other major cities to speak out publicly by refusing to take part the genocide campaign. An Abgal, who was frustrated by the continuous silence of other Somalis while systematically massacres were in full swing in Hargeisa, sent the following message to his own clan in the form of the following poem:



Dalkeyga daafac diidmayo,

Issaq ku duul doonimaayo.

Translated into English:

I do not refuse to defend my motherland,

But, I will never ever carry out,

A cowardly craven attack on the Issaq



Despite the fact that General Barre is now in three feet deep, where he is being mercilessly grilled for the crimes he committed against humanity, still for the Ogaden the war is not yet over. As it has been repeatedly stated by its leaders at several occasions, ONLF is till technically at war with Somaliland. During his fundraising trip to London three years ago, Admiral Mohamed Omer, the ONLF leader, explained to his Ogaden audience that his clan was still technically at war with Somaliland government and its people. Admiral Mohamed Omer, who was known as Barre’s spittoon carrier, was speaking his mind. The Admiral’s statements once again stoked the embers of what has already been smouldering in the region.

Another Ogaden who does not equivocate about the war that he his faction is intended to launch against Somaliland is Col.Hassan Turki. Col.Turki, who indiscriminately massacred innocent nomads in brutal fashion in Odweyne district, as General Morgan’s brigade commander in 1988, is camouflaging with Islamic religion as a cleric somewhere in Somalia. Behind the white Muslim gown that he wears, there is a werewolf.



Ogaden’s relations with rest of Somalis



The root cause of the current deteriorating relations between the Ogadenis and the majority Somalis in the region goes back to the unilateral disbanding of the Western Somali Liberation in 1977.The dissolution of WSLF, which widely represented all Somali Ethiopians, has created a hitherto unprecedented chasm that finally reached unbearable stage. The Ogadens, under the leadership of General Barre’s former soldiers are seen by majority of non-Ogadens as security menace to their own regions. The creation of Ogaden Liberation Front (ONLF) by General Barre, essentially to become a full-fledged division in the Somali army forces’ has compelled the non-Ogadens to draw their own policy strategy through their democratically elected representatives in the Federal Parliament of Ethiopia.



The non-Ogadenis, whose vast territories stretch from Gaashamo in the East to Aware- Afdam in the extreme West, near Awaash valley, and from Ceel-kari in the Southwest to Feer-feer in the East, have separately initiated their own inter-clan defence pact with aim of heading off any terrorist infiltrations into their regions. The traditional sultans and clan chiefs of non-Ogadenis have spoken in a loud and clear language by sending the following message to the Ogadenis through their elected deputies in the Federal Parliament of Ethiopia:-



1. Whether to secede or not is solely a matter for Ogadenis, so long they do not claim our vast territories which do not belong to them. Calling our regions as “Ogadenia” amounts to a declaration of war on us.



2. While maintaining peace and security in our regions, we support and upheld the Federal Constitution, which gives all ethnic groups the right to self-administration, the right to preserve their tradition culture, the right to use their own language in their own regions, and above everything else, unrestricted right to self-determination up to secession, in internationally supervised referendum, as the in the case of Eritrea.



3. In line with official policy of the Federal Government of Ethiopia, we respect the territorial integrity of all Somali speaking nations, such as Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia and Kenya, with whom we share fraternal ties.



4. We support the special relations that Ethiopia currently maintains with Somaliland Republic, which gave us a lee way to benefit from commercial goods we receive through border customs controlled by both governments.



5. We call on the Federal Government of Ethiopia to conduct immediate statistical surveys to determine the majority clans with whom future negotiation could be held in the Somali region



Lack of traditional wise men



The absence of Ogaden traditional wise men to negotiate peace with other Somalis in Zone-five has created a society prone to conflicts. Taking advantage of the mistrust that today exist among the different clans in the region, the ONLF exacerbated the situation by riding a roughshod over the traditional system of solving inter-clan disputes in the region.



The ONLF leadership has mischievously undermined traditional co-existence of different Somali clans which formed the very fabrics of Somali society. Somalis belong to a closely knitted society that one cannot live without the other. There is no a single family that has no close relatives with other clans in the Zone-five. It is beyond exaggeration that, for every ten Ogaden-reer Issaq in Dagahbour district, seven of them have matrilineal affinity with Issaqs of the same region. The same affinity relation goes the other way round. One’s matrilineal relatives such as, uncles, nephews, nieces and ants are closer that one’s patrilineal affinity when it comes to visceral feelings. Six of the eight active military generals, (including the current ONLF leader) whose mothers came from Issaq clan were responsible for frog marching their Ogadeni militias into Hargeisa to take part in the genocidal campaigns, thus, destroying the traditional fabrics in which Somalis solved their disputes through peaceful means. These generals once formed the backbone of Barre’s army forces.



The people of Ogaden clan had never been offered from their own traditional chiefs an alternative solution to war. The traditional leaders have gone haywire. They fell into a perpetual dilemma from which nothing can extract them. In other Somali regions, chieftainship however, carries a lot of weight and unquestionable loyalty and authority.



Fully supporting Col.Yusuf’s phantasmal presidency



It is irony, that the Ogadenis whose guerrillas are fighting with the Ethiopian government to form a purely “Ogadenian state” with “Ogadenian flag” in Eastern Ethiopia (excluding the rest of other major tribes) have rallied their undying support behind the phantasmal president of the so called transitional federal government of Somalia, Col. Yuasuf, for his current Mogadishu’s racial onslaught, with help of Ethiopian soldiers. The Ogadenis, who blame Ethiopian government for allegedly committing human rights violations in their own region, are supporting Prime Minister Melese Zenawi’s intimate friend, Col Yusuf, who brought into Somalia thousands of Ethiopian troops to annihilate the giant Hawiyes from the surface of the earth. It is here where history repeats itself. For the Ogadenis, the daily artillery bombardments of the residential areas of Mogadishu that claimed so far thousands of innocent lives are simply “the pranks” of Barre’s October celebration. For the Ogadanis, the daily report on the nearly millions of Hawiyas who are facing humanitarian crisis in open areas outside Mogadishu, is simply a hogwash, designed to discredit Col .Yusuf’s policy. It is a belief widely held among the Ogaden’s elites in the Diaspora and their Majeerteenian allies, that the creation of a government which would serve their own interest is possible only if Hawiye clan is weakened considerably with help of Ethiopian troops. The Ogadenis who have no a region of their own in Somalia, except that tiny tsetse fly infested town of Afmadey, near the Kenyan border, see the TFG a springboard to resuscitate a General Barre’s type of government. In this regard, one of Col.Yusuf’s top security advisors is Col.Ahmed Omer Jess, formerly, General Morgan’s deputy commander in Somaliland at the height of genocidal campaign. This kind of belief has been echoed recently by one Col.Yusuf’s close confidantes. During his recent private visit to Kenya, the TFG’s Minster of Post and Telecommunication, Mohammud Tarrax, has been quoted by his own cousin as saying that his clan has no other alternatives except to support Col.Yusuf’s efforts to bring the Hawiyes into their knees in order to form a future stable government, which would serve their interest. Mr.Tarax, who served in Barre’s government as Head of the National Refugee Commission with status of a minister without portfolio that enabled him to participate in the cabinet meetings, said, in his words:



“We, Ogadenis have adopted a new lifestyle in Somalia which is quite different from the nomadic harsh living conditions in Ethiopia. Our living style has been changed dramatically during the long years we lived in Somalia as government officials. I personally can not go back to that dusty town of Dagahbour where everything is at stake. Dagahbour is no longer my hometown. This opinion is shared with me by every Ogaden in the parliament.”



Tarax’s statement was simply a confirmation of a long held view which the Ogadens received through the sieve of Barre’s orientation centres. The Ogaden officials whose families live in better and secure places in Europe and USA must understand that they are gambling with lives of their innocent civilians who already became victims of wide devastations caused by manmade conflicts and droughts. This kind of talk is poppy-talk. It further isolated them from other Somalis in Somalia.



Relentless propaganda campaign against Somaliland



The daily barrage of vitriolic attacks on Somaliland government and its peace loving people by Ogadens in the Diaspora has left a bitter taste in everybody’s mouth. A day hardly passes without the people of Somaliland being insulted as “secessionists” and “renegades”. The Ogadenis, although they had never shared a union with Somaliland as they belong to Ethiopia, still spared no efforts in campaigning for the destruction of Somaliland, ever since General Barre’s fascist regime was ousted by the combining forces of USC and SNM 1991.Such daily vitriolic attacks would have a negative effect on the thousands of Ogadens, who live peacefully in Somaliland’s major cities, mainly as businessmen without being reminded the atrocities committed by their own brothers in the past. It is beyond doubt that the opprobrium raised by the continuous hate articles posted on ONLF’s propaganda arm , will have a boomerang effect on the future relationship among Somalis where ever they are, be in Djibouti, or in Ethiopia. For instance, One of the extreme anti-Somaliland campaigners has recently crossed the dangerous redline by vehemently defending publicly the aerial and artillery bombardments of major cities in Somaliland by fascist forces.

In his article, under the title of “Somaliland: the way forward” Abdullah Doole had unwaveringly defended the atrocities carried out by General Barre’s forces in which over sixty thousand innocent civilians were bombed to death, arguing that every government has unreserved rights to put down rebellions like SNM.The same man who campaigned in London for the expulsion of SNM representatives in 1980s as one of Barre’s top diplomats, has breathed fire on Somaliland government for deporting the ONLF operatives from Hargeisa to Ethiopia, a friendly country that gave sanctuaries to nearly a million Somalilanders who fled for their lives in the middle of continuous air and ground bombardments in 1988. In another article, also posted on Wardheer Website, ONLF’s propaganda arm, he described the deportation of ONLF’s operatives as “unacceptable.” Unacceptable to whom?”



The appointment of a notorious Turkey jackanapes as ONLF’s adviser on media affairs is another example that reflects the Ogaden’s hostile attitude towards the people of Somaliland. The Greek born Turkey, Muhammed Shamsaddin Megalommotis, who has no knowledge about Africa Union’s Continental Charter, that upholds the inviolability of borders inherited from colonial powers, as the case is for Somaliland, is in fact, a despicable nuisance to the intellectual community in East Africa at large. His abusive titles, edited by ONLF’s representatives, reflected a profound ignorance about Somaliland’s historical facts. The fund allocated to such a moron who writes abusive headlines for the articles written by other anti-Somaliland’s campaigners could have been spent in the Ogaden region where, because of the continuous drought, wide spread hunger and manmade conflicts, thousands of civilians are dying on daily bases for want of food. It would have been money well-spent had it been used for buying stools for young school kids who are sitting on empty cans under tree in Wardheer.It took everybody by surprise that a notorious outcast has become ONLF’s new tintinnabulist. Hurling all kinds of silly adjectives at highly respected leadership of Somaliland is un-Somali, as it is also un-Islamic .Hurling silly adjectives at democratically elected President of Somaliland Republic serves no one’s interest. Instead, it strengthens his position as a president, whose people are rallying behind him. Such unjustified hate media campaign has brought other Somalis in to the fray.



In conclusion, to remove the present deep trust that took root during General Barre’s dictatorial rule in Somalia, the Ogadens must adopt some kind of modus vivendi that would enable them bury the hatchet with other Somalis. The spirit of tolerance and maturity shown by Somalilanders must be reciprocated amicably and positively. The ONLF’s quixotic expedition must be tethered before it ends in disaster.



My goal of presenting this article was precisely to provide a brief historical genealogy of the current Ogaden’s self-imposed isolation for which they have already paid a heavy price. I had the privilege to travel extensively in the regions inhabited by Somali Ethiopians, during which I have witnessed with my own naked eyes the prevailing state of beggar-hood. If the Ogadens do not come terms with reality, then the present self-imposed isolation will lead them to further self-destruction and self-immolation.



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SUFISM IN SOMALIA I>M LEWIS



Sufism in Somaliland: a Study in Tribal Islam - Part One. Part Two BY I.M. LEWIS • Although Somaliland has attracted the attention of a distinguished body of Italian scholars it has not yet been subjected to a specifically social anthropological study such as the present writer hopes to make. Excellent studies notably by Puccioni (1919-1937), Cerulli (1918-1943), and Colucci (1924,1943) have elucidated the sociology of the Somali and created a sound corpus of knowledge for future investigations. Colucci's Principi di diritto consuetudinario della Somalia Meridionale (1924) provides a penetrating analysis delineating with great clarity the general framework of Somali social organization and the political structure of the Sab tribes of Somalia in terms of lineage organization. Cerulli's studies of tribal custom and social organization are also of great value; his ' Note sul movimento musulmano nella Somalia ', published over 30 years ago, is at present the foundation of all studies of Islam amongst the Somali. The present paper attempts to set this and other material on Somali religion in the context of the sociological investigation of the literature of the Somali which I have made elsewhere (Lewis, 1966), and in which I have been guided by Somali informants in London. It is hoped that the procedure adopted here may be of vague in suggesting the lines along which field studies of Islam amongst the Somali might profitably be conducted, and also that it may make some contribution to studies of Islam amongst tribal societies generally. (1) Introduction A DESCRIPTION and analysis of religion have now come to be regarded as essential components in any satisfactory study of society. In no case, probably, is this more necessary than in that of an Islamic people where the study of Islam tends to throw as much light on the social structure as the study of the social structure does upon religion. This close interdependence has always been particularly clear in Muslim societies with a state-like structure where the Shari'a (the religious law in the widest sense) has had a wide field of application, although, of course, with the progressive Westernization of the Islamic world the gap between the spiritual and temporal realms is again widening (cf. Gibb, 1947; Milliot, 1949; Falkhry, 1954). But the conformity of social and religious structure is equally far-reaching in a tribal Muslim society although it may not at first sight appear so (2). Somali society is a case in point. This essay sets out to examine the role of Sufism in the social structure of the Somali and is designed to elucidate the nature and function of Somali genealogies. It is unnecessary here to justify the ethnic classification "South-Eastern Cushites" which embraces the Somali, Afar, Saho, Galla, and Beja, and which rests upon similarities in material and social culture, including religion, and upon traditions of common origin (3). I assume here that the pre-Islamic religion of the Muslim structure of Somali society owes much to the interpretation of Islam in terms of Cushitic belief. It follows that it should be possible to relate the social functions of present-day Somali Sufism to syncretism between the two religions. There are still a few tribes (e.g. some of the Dir and Hawiye) upon whom Islam has as yet made little impression and whose Cushitic culture is correspondingly little modified. Again among some of the southern tribes of Somalia, especially those of the shown, and much of the terminology and beliefs of Cushitic religion persists and are applied to Islam. In interpreting Cushitic belief and practice in their present form among the Somali, the wider literature describing the religion of the Afar, Saho, and Galla has been drawn upon, but I do not deduce from Cushitic religion in general any belief or custom for whose independent existence among the Somali there is not ample evidence. It is not implied that all those features of Somali social structure whose interaction with Islam is considered are necessarily typically Cushitic, but simply that in the pre-Islamic state of Somali society they were related to Cushitic institutions. We shall deal particularly with Sufism and examine the way in which its social organization, political and religious structure are associated with the baraka of Sufi sheikhs and their personal genealogies which trace religious power to the lineage of the Prophet Mohammed. It will be argued that the genealogical canalization of divine grace (baraka) dependent upon connexion with Mohammed's clan of Quraysh finds close parallels in the social and religious functions of Somali tribal genealogies (abtirsiinyo). These similarities in function between Arabian genealogies in Sufism and genealogies in the traditional (pre-Islamic) social order account for the ease with which the genealogies of Sufi sheikhs are absorbed amongst the Somali and underlie the Somali claim to descent from the Prophet. Such an interpretation, it will be noticed, does not depend upon the validity of the preceding assumptions on the nature of Cushitic religion, but, since these seem well established it is relevant to consider in the incorporation of Sufi genealogies (4) into the Somali lineage structure in relation to them. The religious functions of Somali genealogies which centre in sacrifice at the tombs of eponymous ancestors are, in the pre-Islamic state of Somali society intrinsically a part of Cushitic religion and knowledge of the larger hierarchy of Cushitic spirit-refractions does, I think, throw light upon the nature of sacrifice to the dead and leads to some elucidation of the religious concepts attached to Somali genealogies. Thus it is proposed that Sufi genealogies are adopted due to the close resemblances in their religious and political functions to Somali tribal genealogies, and that this assimilation corresponds to underlying similarities in the Cushitic and Sufi religious concepts which attach to genealogies. I. Preliminary Some 2,000,000 in number, the Somali occupy the territories of French, British, and ex-Italian Somaliland (the United Nations Trusteeship Territory of Somalia administered by Italy), the south-east dependencies of Ethiopia, and the Northern Frontier Province of Kenya. They are essentially nomadic pastoralists owning in abundance sheep, goats, cattle, and camels used for milking and the transport of the nomad's hut and possessions. In some parts of southern Somalia oxen replace camels as burden animals. Some temporary cultivation is practised, but as a whole, there is little permanent cultivation in the barren pastureland of the north. In the south, however, arable land occurs along the courses of the two rivers which water Somalia (the Shebelle and the Juba), and in the hinterland between them. Here enclaved settlements of Negroes, Bantu and others, are engaged in permanent cultivation, and some Somali tribes, especially those of the Sab family, have adopted a sedentary mode of life. Mixed farming is characteristic of this region, and, under the stimulus of administrative development, there is an increasing tendency for nomadism and transhumance to give place eventually to fixed cultivation. The Somali nation comprises two main subdivisions, the ' Soomaali ' and the ' Sab (5) The Sab tribes form an extensive wedge of cultivators between the rivers of Somalia and separate the nomads of northern Somaliland from those of the south. The ' Soomaali ', who are numerically superior, despise the ' Sab ' for their sedentary way of life, for their obscure origins (Galla and Negroid admixture is pronounced), and for their mixed genealogies. Nevertheless, Sab are included in the designation ' Soomaali ' by outsiders, in much the same way as the inhabitants of the British Isles are frequently indiscriminately referred to as ' English '. Within the Somali nation, Soomaali and Sab are differentiated although there is an increasing tendency for the Soomaali/Sab cleavage to be ignored in the rising tide of Somali nationalism. Urbanized and westernized Somali maintain that discrimination is "old-fashioned", that it is contrary to the injunctions of the Prophet, and that it undermines the unity of the Somali people. In practice and actual social relations, however, these ideals are often betrayed, which serves to indicate how deeply engrained the traditional Somali social order is. Still, within Somaliland, the cleavage remains the primary subdivision of the Somali nation. and in the rest of this paper (3). I shall use the term ' Somali ' t to include the Sab except where a distinction is expressly stated. Each comprises a vast segmentary system of units which may be classified as: tribal families (of which there are seven: Dir, Hawiye, Pre-Hawiye, Isaaq, Daarood, Digil, and Rahanwiin), confederacies, sub-confederacies, tribes, and tribal sections. This terminology which I have elsewhere described (Lewis, 1955, pp.14-40) is illustrated in the accompanying chart. Condensed genealogy of the Somali nation, representing segmentation into social groups, with specimen segmentation of one tribal family, the Daarood (Lewis, 1955, p.15). Qurayshitic lineage Aqil Ibn Abi Talib Hill Samaale Irir PreHawiye Sab Digil * Tunni (1) Rahanwiin Irir Daarood Dir Hawiye Gadabuursi (2) Isaaq Daarood (Tribal family) Harti (Conferacy) Majeerteen (Sub-Conferacy) Usman Muhamuud (Tribe) * Somali tribal families. (1) The Tunni are a tribal confederacy rather than a tribal family (2) The Gadabuursi are of uncertain affiliation, they may belong to the Dir tribal family The tribe stands out as a clearly defined unit which embraces the most generally effective social solidarity. Cattle-theft and war characterize the relations between tribes, and intertribal hostility is frequently of long standing. Internally the tribe tends to be divided by feud amongst its fractions. Within the tribe, however, homicide is normally settled peaceably by payment of blood compensation. With the extended enforcement of the European administrative system tribes are now also, whenever possible, obliged to settle their differences by payment of compensation in place of further fighting. The obligations entailed by tribal membership are clearly formulated in the procedure for the adoption of strangers (10), who undertake to share tribal responsibility in payment and receipt of blood-price and in other matters. In essence the tribe is of one blood, and it is, in short, a social, territorial, political, and to some extent religious unit closely similar to that of the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard, 1940) or of the Arab Bedouin (Jaussen, 1948). It is not, however, entirely exogamous (11). Like the total Somali society of which it is the microcosm, the tribe constitutes a balanced system of sections of various orders of segmentation. In some cases there may be no more than three orders of segmentation within the tribe, but in most cases there are at least four, for some tribes boast as many as 100,000 members. The average. however, seems to be about 20,000 tribesmen. It will be seen that the Somali tribe is a relatively large unit, with a fairly high degree of internal segmentation. In each political unit from the basic group of closely related families to the tribal confederacy, the elders constitute a council representative of the group's interests and convened by a political figurehead. In the tradition of the medieval period when the petty Muslim sultanates of southern Eritrea and north-western Ethiopia engaged (Christian Ethiopia in war, chiefs are styled both by the Somali and by the Administrations as ' Sultan'. But this title does not imply that its incumbents wield authority over a centralized state and is not to be understood in the classical Muslim sense (12). Normally the tribe recognizes a chieftain (called variously boqor, garaad, ugaas), as president of the tribal council. Yet not every tribe owns a common chief. In effect, a chief's authority derives from the structural situation - from the circumstances of tribal allegiance - and fluctuates with it. His power depends largely upon his personality. Thus the position of the Somali chief is closely similar to that of an Arabian sheik (Montagne, 1947, p. 59). Considerable religious power attaches to a chief. In the past chieftaincy seems to have been connected with rainmaking, and there is evidence that this function is still retained amongst the less Islamized tribes of the north-west corner of British Somaliland and of certain parts of Somalia. In many cases, the chief still conducts periodical rainmaking ceremonies (roobdoon ' seeking water') and the great rite (lak) performed in Somalia to mark the onset of the main rains. The chief's glance is referred to as "the burning eye" (il kulul ) and his person is so strongly endowed with power that among some closely related tribes it is usual for a visiting chief to avoid a face to face encounter with his equivalent and to be greeted indirectly by a representative. Consequent upon his special relation with God, a chief can call down blessing or misfortune upon his people and their stock. From the structural point of view, his most important function is to preside at the ceremonies which are held at the tombs of the eponymous tribal ancestors in commemoration of them. Each tribal section celebrates its founder at his shrine, offering up its own particular form of sacrifice (13). (Cerulli, 1913. p.7). Where a hereditary chief is recognized members of his family (called Gob) represent him at sacrifices performed by the heads of subsidiary tribal fractions. In the case of tribal confederacies with a chiefly lineage the same procedure is followed in the ceremonies of component tribes. It is this duty more than any other which establishes the sanctity of a hereditary chief, for, when he represents his people in sacrifice at the eponymous ancestor's shrine, it is his own lineal ancestor whom he commemorates before God. He, the living representative of the founding ancestors, is the closest descendant of those whom he celebrates on behalf of his tribe. Generations later, he in his turn will be regarded as an eponymous founder and will be commemorated in sacrifice by his descendants on behalf of their tribesmen. In the traditional accounts of war and migration it is always the religious aspects of leadership which are signalled out and held to be responsible for the success of one group at the expense of another. The fortunes of war are to some extent regarded as a reflection of ritual efficacy. On the political side again, there is no specifically constituted police organization to enforce the decision which are arrived at by the chief in council, except of course in the pseudo-sultanates which have remained a legacy from earlier times, in some parts of Somalia (Cerulli, 1919, pp 16 ff.). The Somali Lineage System The emphasis placed by Somali upon descent has already been indicated. In fact, the key to an understanding of Somali social structure lies in the functions exercised by genealogies (abtirsiinyo). Corresponding to the segmentary tribal system described is an equally highly segmented lineage system, different orders of fragmentation and aggregation in which are coordinate with equivalent levels of segmentation in the tribal system. The total genealogical tree of the Somali nation represents the unity of all its component parts: tribal families, confederacies. sub-confederacies, tribes, and tribal sections. Social propinquity is expressed in terms of agnatic kinship. The relations between groups of every order are in genealogical idiom expressed as relationships between eponymous ancestors. At a higher level than the tertiary tribal section, or, perhaps in some cases the secondary, such postulated kinship is largely fictitious, of course. Nevertheless it is the principle which Somali assume to underlie social relationship. The basis of political action is the agnatic lineage system - it's religious significance relates to the eponymous ancestors to which it refers, and who are celebrated in the sacrifices performed at their tombs. Such is the traditional social system associated with nomadism and preserved where nomadism still prevails. In the south, however, where sedentary cultivation is replacing nomadism, the relations between territorial groups cease to be always expressible in terms of descent. Here the lineage system is disintegrating. The process of change is gradual; at first territorial units form having a mixed clan or lineage structure in which the political unit is co-ordinate with a dominant clan or lineage. With subsequent development and the continued settlement in the same territorial unit of increasing numbers of immigrants of heterogeneous clan origin, the agnatic lineage structure becomes so distorted and confused that the segmentation of the dominant lineage no longer represents territorial distribution and ceases to have political functions. The principle that neighbours must be agnatic kinsmen. that territorial proximity implies genealogical propinquity, no longer holds. Such disorganization is particularly characteristic of the agricultural tribes of the Sab family. It is important, however, to observe that although the characteristic social unit of these regions is an agricultural settlement or ' mixed-village' (Lewis, 1955. p. 95) with a rudimentary state-like political organization in which lineages have no political significance, agnatic kinship may still be applied at a higher level to describe the relations between larger territorial aggregates such as tribes or tribal confederacies. It is certainly in terms of agnatic kinship, for example, that the relations between tribal families are described although relations among the component units within the Sab family are not at all levels represented genealogically. There is thus a certain inconsistency in the organization of political relations at different levels of the political structure. The lineage system which is the fundamental principle is superseded amongst the smaller units of the Sab, but retains its functions amongst those of a higher order and referring to the tribal families knits the Somali people together as the issue of the Prophet's lineage. There are, . as has been mentioned, seven tribal families - Dir, Pre-Hawiye, Hawiye, Daarood, and Ishaaq of the ' Soomaali ' group; and Digil and Rahanwiin of the ' Sab '. To-day there are few Dir tribes and their importance lies rather in having given rise, through the intermarriage of Dir's daughters with immigrant Arabs, to the great Ishaaq and Daarood tribal families. Ishaaq and Daarood reached the Somali coast at a date which has not yet been historically established but which tradition places between the Hejira and the 15th century (Lewis, 1955, pp. 15-9, 23-4). Traditions of Arabian descent are especially strong amongst the Ishaaq and Daarood. but are held independently by the Hawiye and Dir and even by many of the Sab tribes who, as it happens, have as good claims to Arabian descent as their northern Somali neighbours (the Dir, Ishaaq, Daarood, and Hawiye), who hold them in such contempt. All tribal families can establish connexion with each other without going as far back as the Prophet's lineage, but the breach between ' Soomaali ' and ' Sab ' is only bridged by tracing descent to the Qurayshitic line of Mohammed. Only at this level of inclusiveness are the Soomaali and Sab joined as the Somali nation, and it is in this context especially that the Somali consider themselves the children of the Prophet. For this solidarity transcends all sectional interests and divisions, including that between Soomaali and Sab and represents a real consciousness of common nationality and religion. Individual genealogies (abtirsiinyo) trace ascent through the hierarchy of social units from the smallest tribal section to the tribal family, through the primary bifurcation of Soomaali/Sab, through the Prophet's descendants, and culminate finally in Mohammed, although they often extend beyond this to include the Prophet's ancestors and resemble typical Arabian genealogies (cf. Wustenfeld, 1853). Usually Somali genealogies are imperfectly Arabized (Islamized) and contain a mixture of Cushitic and Arabic names indicative of the absorption of Arab genealogies. Unless, however, Somali wishes to emphasize their exclusiveness with respect to other peoples, that is when only relations between Somali are in question, the genealogies given stop at Soomaali or Sab and comprise between 22 and 30 names. At their greatest extension, genealogies representing political and religious connexion are drawn out to embrace the Prophet and his lineage. II. ISLAM Relations with Arabia: the Introduction of Islam The historical foundations for the contemporary claim to descent from the Prophet lie in the existence of relations between Somaliland and Arabia from the earliest times. Immigration from and to Arabia has always been and still is a constant feature of Somali life. There has always been a considerable floating population of Arabs in various stages of absorption among the Somali. Moreover, there is little doubt that Islam reached Somaliland shortly after the Hejira and its establishment is recorded by Arab writers of the 9th and 10th centuries. The coastal commercial colonies which had been founded by the Himyarite Kingdom before Islam eventually developed into the small Muslim states of Zeila (in its widest extension known as Adal) in British Somaliland, and of Mogadishu in Somalia. These were ruled by local dynasties of Somalized Arabs or Arabized Somalis. The history of Zeila has been adequately described by Trimingham (1952, pp. 58 ff.) and need be no more than summarized here. Cerulli's research (Cerulli, 1994, 1996, 1927) shows that from the beginning of the 10th until half-way through the 13th century Mogadishu was functioning as a trading colony which comprised a federation of Arabian tribes. Persians also played some part in its early history. The Arab settlers had elected chiefs and acknowledged the religious and jural authority of one lineage, the Qahtan ibn Wa'il. In the course of time Somali influence increased and from a loose federation of Arab-Somali peoples, a sultanate with a local dynasty (the Muzaffar) emerged in the 13th century. The Muzaffar sultanate flourished in the 13th and 14th centuries and by this time Shangani and Hamarwein, the two halves of the town of Mogadishu, were firmly established and Hamarwein was dominant. This dynasty survived into the 16th century when the sultanate declined as a commercial centre and reverted to a hegemony of small townships. At the same time Mogadishu was under pressure from tribes of the Hawiye tribal family who were advancing southwards through Somalia. By the second half of the 18th century Somalis had gained control of Shangani and imposed their imam as ruler of Mogadishu. Portuguese and British colonization contributed to the final collapse of the sultanate. In the 17th century the town had been occupied by the Imam of Oman for a short space, and remained after his withdrawal in vague dependence to him. With the division of the Muscat State early in the l9th century, Mogadishu was allotted to the Sultan of Zanzibar, who attempted to secure a more binding dependence by establishing military garrisons along the coast. Almost immediately after, these were sold to Italy and Mogadishu became part of the former Italian colony of Somalia. Southern Ethiopia supplied Zeila with its trade and the town reached its greatest heights in the 14th century, but began to decline after Ahmad Granhe's celebrated campaigns against Christian Ethiopia in the 16th century. Its history was from the beginning the chronicle of a series of wars against the Ethiopian infidels waged in alliance with the other petty Muslim states of southern Eritrea and north-eastern Ethiopia. Mogadishu, as we have seen, had a shorter period of prosperity in the 11th century and then declined fairly rapidly under the joint pressure of nomadic incursions from the interior and the influence of external colonization. Such centres as these had an important effect in the development of Islam among the Somali. With the Arabian colonies firmly entrenched in the other trading ports they provided a foothold from which Mohammedanism spread amongst the nomads of the interior.(14) Sufism among the Somali The Somali are orthodox Sunnis and adherents of the Shafi'ite rite of the Shari'a. Sufism is well developed and the remainder of this paper will deal with the role of Sufism in Somali society. As is well known, this revitalizing current arose in Islam between the 9th and 10th centuries, attaining in its classical form its aesthetic and theological climax in the l1th and 13th centuries. True Sufism is now considered by some authorities to be in decadence (Arberry, 1950). In Somaliland after a period of great activity and general expansion up till the 1930's, the Dervish movement seems to be on the wane, although it is extremely difficult to assess its true importance at the present day. Tribal Sufism has always tended to form a conservative barrier against European administration and many of its adherents have strongly opposed the extension of education lest it should undermine their authority. Administrative hostility, real or imagined, has reinforced the esoteric and clandestine character of Sufi practice and made it all the more difficult to estimate its true significance. However, it is not difficult to study its functional importance as a movement in the social structure of Somali society, for whatever its present number of adherents, it has left an indelible impression as will be seen. The adherents of Sufism belong to the congregations or communities, in many Muslim countries known as zawiya, in Somaliland as jama'a, of the various Orders (tariqa,'The Way ') into which the movement is divided according to the doctrines and services (dhikr) ordained by the founders of Orders. Tariqa means 'path' in the sense of the Way to follow in the search for righteousness and the Way to God. The end of the tariqa is ma'rifa, absorption in God (gnosis). Those who have travelled furthest, through virtue, the practice of devotion, and the grace which God has vouchsafed them are nearest Him. As the Path is traversed successive steps of the way are demarcated as ' stations ' or ' states '. These are discussed below. For his godliness and virtue the founder of each Order is held to be closer to God and to exemplify in his teaching and life the True Path which it behooves the zealous to follow. The founder is a guide who through his particular qualities of devotion. and by his special virtue including the grace (baraka) bestowed upon him by God leads his disciples towards God. His baraka passes to those who follow in his Path and dedicate their lives to his example. Each Order is distinguished by the specific discipline which its founder has established as the True Path. Since there is no God but Allah and Mohammed is His Prophet, religious prestige is a function of connexion with the Prophet's Qurayshitic lineage. Thus those in whose blood (recorded in personal genealogies) the Prophet's grace (baraka ) flows are eminently suitable for election to the office of head (khalifa) of an Order or of a congregation (Sheik). Sheiks and khalefas, as also the founders of the Orders themselves, have personal genealogies tracing descent from ancestors connected with Mohammed. To what extent such claims are historically true is in the present context irrelevant. The tradition is that descent from Quraysh entitles to religious office and that to be a Sufi sheik or khalifa implies such descent. Thus in their furthest extension the personal genealogies of the founders of Orders and of their local representatives, sheiks and khalifas, reach back to the Prophet's lineage. According to the lineage principle in terms of which relationships in Somaliland are understood each jama'a is identified with the genealogy of its khalifa or sheik. The consequences of this in the total genealogical structure of Somali society will shortly be seen. Within each tariqa the authority of the incumbent of the office of regional khalifa is founded upon a chain of tradition which has two branches. Unlike his personal genealogy, these attach to the office, not to the person. The silsilat al-baraka (chain of benediction) traces the chain of grace which unfolds from the founder of the Order through his successive disciples down to the present incumbent of the office of khalifa. The silsilat al-wird, the other branch, connects the founder with the Prophet and, through his mediation, with Allah. The silsila (lit. 'chain ' ) consists of a list of names through which spiritual affiliation is traced and in some ways resembles a genealogy. It is quite separate, however, from the sheik's personal genealogy although that also is regarded as endowed with power. In initiation (wird), the covenant ('ahd) of the tariqa is administered to the novice by the head of the community in a formal ceremony at which the service (dhikr) pertaining to the Order is celebrated (for a description, see Robecchi-Bricchetti, 1899, p. 423; Trimingham, 1952, p. 237). The novice swears to accept the khalifa as his guide and spiritual director through the baraka of the founder. He is then instructed in the performance of prayer tasks (called variously awrad, ahzab, and rawatib), and is provided with a prayer-mat to carry upon his shoulder, a vessel for ablution, and a rosary (tusbah) to finger as he recites his prayers. Somali tariqas are characterized by fewer stages in the novice's progress towards illumination than were customary in classical Sufism (see on this point, Arberry, 1950, pp. 74- ff.). At first the novice is styled 'aspirant' (murid) but also referred to by his brethren ('ikwan') as ' brother '. The majority of initiates never proceed beyond this stage. Qutb, which is the next step, requires a certain degree of mystical perfection but is not comparable to the qutb of literary Sufism. Each successive step becomes increasingly difficult, and al-wasil the next grade, signifying union with God after long strife (i.e. the attainment of gnosis), corresponds to induction to the leadership of a fraternity. Al-maddad, the final goal, is attained by few pilgrims indeed, for it is that reached usually only by the founders of the Orders themselves. Membership of the community does not imply celibacy; adherents live with their families in the community. Women have their own tariqas where they participate in the services in the name of the Prophet's daughter, Fatima, whom they regard as the founder of women's Orders. Female adherents are veiled (the veil is not normally worn by women in Somaliland), and are generally more amply clad than other Somali women. But for them also there is no embargo on marriage. There are always many people who although not formally admitted to an Order and not living in the community, follow the public ceremonies while ignorant of their esoteric content. Acknowledging the piety and religious powers of the founder whom they venerate as a saint, they regularly call upon his followers whom they regard as similarly endowed to act as mediators in disputes. Many of the brethren thus fulfil the functions of qadis and this is one of the many ways in which the sphere of interest of the Sufi community encroaches upon that of the tribal structure. Tribesmen turn to the head of the jama'a for assistance and counsel, to the neglect of the tribal authorities This is one instance of a wide and far-reaching conflict between Sufism on the one hand and the tribal organization on the other which we shall consider in some detail below. SOMALI TARIQAS The three most prominent tariqas in Somaliland are in the order of their introduction, the Qadiriya, the Ahmediya, and the Saalihiya. The Rifa'iyya tariqa is represented amongst Arab settlers but is not widely distributed or important. In the south the Order's main centres are the coastal towns of Mogadishu and Merka: there are also some adherents in the British Protectorate. The Qadiriya, the oldest Sufi Order in Islam, was introduced into Harar in the 15th century by Sharif Abu Bakr ibn 'Abd Allah al-'Aydarus (known as al-Qutb ar-Rabbani, ("The Divine Axis"), who died in 1508-9 (A.H.91 1 ) . Abu Bakr is probably the best-known Shai'ite saint in southern Arabia - where he is called al-'Adani (15) and his mosque is the most famous in Aden (16). The Qadiriya became the official Order of Harar and has considerable influence in the surrounding country. To the south the Order does not appear to have acquired much importance in the interior of Somalia until the beginning of the l9th century when the settlement of Bardera, known locally as jamaha, was founded on the Juba river. The Qadiriya has a high reputation for orthodoxy, is on the whole literary rather than propagandist, and is said to maintain a higher standard of Islamic instruction than its rivals. The Ahmediya, and the derivative Saalihiya, were both introduced into southern Somalia towards the close of the last century, although the Ahmediya may have entered British Somaliland somewhat earlier. This Order was founded by Sayyid Ahmad ibn Idris al-Fasi (1760-1837) of Mecca and brought to Somalia by Sheik Ali Maye Durogba of Merka. Muhammad ibn Salih, in 1887, founded the Saalihiya as an offshoot of the Rashidiya founded by Ahmad ibn Idris's pupil Ibrahlm al-Rashid (Cerulli, 1923, pp. 11, 12; Trimingham, 1959, pp. 235 6). The principal Saalihiya proselytizer in Somalia was Sheik Muhammad Guled, a former slave, who launched the Order there by the foundation of a community among the Shidle (a Negroid people occupying the mid-reaches of the Shebelle river, see Lewis, 1955, p. 41). Muhammad Guled died in 1918 and his tomb is at Misra (named after Cairo, Misra in Somali), one of the communities which he had established among the Shidle. The Order's stronghold is in Somalia but there are some communities in British Somaliland. According to Cerulli (op. cit., pp. 14, 18) the Saalihiya is strongly propagandist and inferior to the Qadiriya in mysticism and teaching. In the past it has been closely associated with Somali nationalism and the two rebellions of this century have taken place under its mantle and in its name. The more important rising was that led by Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah (born about 1865) of the Habr Suleemaan Ogaadeen tribe, who made several pilgrimages to Mecca (1890-9), and joining the Saalihiya, sought to attract the northern Somali to this Order. He founded several communities and in 1895 proclaimed himself khalifa-designate in Somaliland. In 1899 he assumed the title of Sunni Mahdi and initiated the jihad against all infidels. He was repudiated by the leader of the Saalihiya in Mecca and from 1900 to 1904 British forces, with from time to time half-hearted Ethiopian and nominal Italian support, conducted four major campaigns against him. His power was continually diminished but the rebellion was never decisively crushed and dragged on until 1920 when the Mahdi died. The Ahmediya with the smallest number of adherents of the three Orders is said to concentrate more on teaching than the Saalihiya (Cerulli, 1923, pp. 12 ff.). Both Orders are for the most part distributed in cultivating villages along the two rivers of Somalia and in the fertile land between them. Qadiriya congregations, on the other hand, are more usually dispersed amongst tribes and do not form autonomous settlements of cultivators. This, naturally, is particularly the case in the north where there is little arable land. Where the congregation forms a stable cultivating settlement, the land, which has been acquired through adoption into a host tribe, is the collective property of the community and is divided among the affiliates by their sheik. Continuity of tenure depends upon the maintenance of satisfactory relations with the tribe of adoption and the regular fulfillment of the various obligations which adoption imposes. Tenure is precarious and is in theory at any time revocable by the ceding tribe. It follows that the individual holdings obtained by affiliates are not automatically inheritable; absolute rights to land or crops are never obtained by members of the community. If a member leaves he relinquishes all rights to his holding and probably his crops also, although he may sometimes be allowed a portion of the harvest. The fields are worked collectively so that the harvest in each brother's holding represents the collective labour of the community. Part of the harvest is used to maintain the funds of the jama'a, which also depend upon gifts made by tribesmen and payments for ritual or religious services performed by affiliates. Liabilities met from these general funds consist of aid to the poor, assistance of pilgrims to Mecca, and expenses connected with missionary work and the various dues payable to the tribe of adoption. As far as the host tribe is concerned the jama'a acts as a tribal section subject to the same privileges and duties as are other sections of the tribe. Congregations act as training centres for the devouts (wadaad), (17) usually described as ' bush teachers ' or ' bush preachers ', who wander from camp to camp through the bush stopping now and then to hold classes where at least some rudimentary knowledge of theology is imparted. In these transitory bush schools children are taught prayers and verses from the Koran and generally acquire the ability to read and write Arabic. Children receive a thorough grounding in the Koran and their familiarity with Koranic texts remains with them throughout their lives. Wadaad are also important as acting in the capacity of unofficial qadis administering the Shari'a to the extent to which its competence is recognized by tribal authorities, i.e. in matrimonial affairs, inheritance of property, contract. mortgage, etc., and assessment of the requisite compensation for injuries (18). In intertribal politics they have little authority to award decisions, and where their recommendations conflict with tribal interests they are normally ignored for Wadaad here act as mediators rather than as arbitrators. It is probably through the Wadaad who issue from the jama'a communities that Sufism exerts its greatest influence in Somali social structure. The parent communities themselves are essentially centres of mystical devotion and have produced a considerable Arab-Somali religious literature written mainly in Arabic but in some cases in Somali transcribed in an adaptation of Arabic script (19). It is probable also that Sufi works are to be found in Somali oral literature and research should be directed to discovering to what extent this is the case. Mysticism is adopted as a means to union with God (gnosis); Somali Sufistic literature treats of divine ecstasy and is similar to Sufi writing in general. An interesting example is an unpublished manuscript called tawassul ash- shaikh Awes written by Sheik Awes, (20) which consists of a collection of songs for dhikr. Where such works are biographical, as for example in the autobiography of Sheik 'Ali Afaye Durogba, (21) they contain an account of the author's justification to claim descent from Quraysh. Almost all such works include a section in which the author's claims to Qurayshitic descent are set forth. Perhaps the most important of Somali Sufi literature is a collection of works by haaji 'Abdullahi Yusif published under the title al-majmu'at al-mubaraka (22). Haaji 'Abdullahi of the Qadiriya tariqa was a member of a group of sheiks (known as Asheraf), (23) attached to the Majeerteen tribes of the Daarood tribal family; his work is analysed by Cerulli (1923, pp. 13-4, 92-5). THE CULT OF SAINTS An important feature of the Sufi communities lies in the extent to which their founders are venerated. The local founders of Orders and congregations ( jama'a) are often sanctified after their death. Their veneration gives rise to cults which overshadow the devotion due to the true founder of the tariqa and even of the Prophet Mohammed. Their tombs become shrines (gashin in Somalia), tended by a small body of followers or the descendants of the sheik and those who have inherited his baraka. To the shrines come the members of the Order as well as local tribesmen who are not initiates, to make sacrifice as occasion demands, and to take part in the annual pilgrimage to the shrine of the saint on the anniversary of his death. Outstanding events in his life are similarly celebrated. Muslim saint-days which have no connexion with indigenous saints are unpopular especially in the interior. But to the extent to which the Qadiriya Order is followed emphasis has been given to the saint-day (mawlid ) of the founder al-Jilani, although even this festival enjoys only limited observance. Saints are not always associated with a particular congregation or Order. Many are ubiquitous, and common to several Orders, share the same veneration within the religion of the country. They are venerated for particular qualities. One of the most popular in Somalia, Saint Au Hiltir (a name suggestive of non-Islamic origin) is regarded as the protector of man from the attacks of crocodiles; another, Saint Au Mad, is recognized by tribes of the Rahanwiin tribal-family as the guardian of the harvest. Tombs are scattered all over Somaliland and many, certainly, commemorate pre-Islamic figures who have been assimilated in Islam. Some of the families acting as the custodians of their ancestors' shrines have developed into small clans, usually dispersed; others have lost all autonomy and are scattered as holy men (wadaad ) proselytizing and teaching. Others again remain attached to a particular tribe as the holders of a hereditary office of qadi. Such, for example, is the case with the seven lineages of the Gasar Gudda tribe of Lugh-Ferrandi in Somalia, where-the office of tribal chief rotates among six lineages, while that of qadi is invested in the seventh, the Rer Dulca Mado (Ferrandi, 1903, pp. 213, 262 ff.; Lewis, 1953, p. 115). This represents one of the possible conclusions in the history of a saintly family attached initially to a tribe in clientship, where the religious group has worked its way into the lineage structure of the tribe and established a permanent position. A good example of a dispersed clan venerated for their baraka are the Rer Sheik Mumin whose ancestor's shrine is at Bur Hakaba among the Elai of southern Somalia. Their influence extends throughout the entire Rahanwiin tribal family and tribute is paid to them on account of their reputation as sorcerers (Ferrandi, 1903, pp. 138-9, 942-3). Ferrandi describes them unflatteringly as a gang of robbers implicated in cattle raiding and profiting by their ancestor's sanctity to impress and exploit ignorant people. A similar dispersed sheikly group are the Au Qutuh of the British Protectorate whom Burton (1894, I, P. 193) described as the descendants of Au Qutb ibn Faqih 'Emar who was then claimed to have crossed from the Hejaz ' ten generations ago ' and to have settled with his six sons in Somaliland. The Au Qutub are widely scattered and are found as far south as the Ogaden. They have the title ' Shaykash ' which Burton translates ' reverend '. In fact, such families of Arabian origin are found all over Somaliland and are often rapidly assimilated in the Somali social structure where their members enjoy high prestige (cf. Cerulli, 1926). THE ROLE OF SUFISM IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE We may now consider the position held by Sufi tariqas and congregations or communities in the social structure. It is obvious that for the total social structure the fraternities provide potential channels of alliance amongst warring tribes separated by the very nature of the tribe. For the communities, economic and political entities though they may be, and often themselves at enmity even within the same Order, are bound together through community of religious purpose. They aim at the development and diffusion of Islam. Such were the ideals so successfully translated into a transcendental movement ignoring the narrow bonds of tribalism by the Saalihiya Mahdi haaji Muhammad b. Abdallah. His campaign is an illustration of the potentialities which the tariqa organization offers for the extension of national unity when a sufficiently great figure emerges to inspire such feeling. Now, as elsewhere in Islam, the new urban political parties seem to have their roots in the tariqa organization and to be a development from it (24). Trans-tribal nationalist aspirations which previously found some outlet in it are now promoted by political associations, the strongest of which is at the moment the Somali Youth League (S.Y.L.). Within the tribal structure individual communities exercise considerable influence, and it is this aspect of their social functions which I wish particularly to consider. As we have seen, among the nomads and especially in the north of Somaliland where there is little or no arable land, communities cannot generally form cultivating settlements as they do in the less barren south. They cannot therefore so easily exist as independent autonomous local groups. Among the southern cultivating tribes (the Sab) settled cultivating communities occupy an interstitial position on the ground. As social entities they are accordingly in a better position to develop into units independent of tribal allegiance and to play an interstitial role in the social structure. This naturally has important consequences in the lineage structure. To take an example. The Qadiriya community of Bardera (known locally as the jamaha) was founded on the Juba River at the beginning of the l9th century by Sheik Ali Kurre, a Rahanwiin tribesman. New settlements quickly sprang up round the mother community. The affiliates were faced with considerable hostility from the surrounding tribes. They fought the Galla Boran, the Gasar Gudda (Somali Rahanwiin) who were successfully defeated and their centre Lugh-Ferrandi destroyed, and, finally, the people of Bardera extended their sway to the coast subjecting the villages of Baidoa, Molimat, and the coastal town of Brava. Thus they established dominion over all tribes of the Rahanwiin tribal family. Retribution, however, was to follow. The Rahanwiin recovered strength under the leadership of the Sultan of the Geledi (then a powerful Rahanwiin tribe), and after a series of battles besieged and destroyed Bardera in 1843. For some years Bardera lay deserted but began to rise again with the foundation of a new community by Sheik Muhammad Eden of the Elai. By 1924 it was possible for Colucci (1924, p. 264) to describe the new centre in the following terms: ' The settlements of Bardera constitute a truly independent territorial group freed from all adherence to the tribes from whom the original grants of land were obtained '. ADOPTION All communities originally enter the tribal structure through an act of adoption. Genealogically this implies incorporation into a lineage. Colucci (1994, pp. 78 ff.) has drawn attention to the frequent occurrence in tribal genealogies of names signifying ' holy ', ' religious ', ' saintly ', etc., which denote the attachment to tribal units of Sufi communities or groups of holy men celebrated for their baraka. Such titles are:sheikal, asheraf', faqir , fogi, 'faqih ', 'haaji ', ' hashya ', and other synonyms not noticed by Colucci. The fact that some tribal families, especially those with particularly strong traditions of Arabian descent such as the Ishaaq and Daarood of northern Somaliland are often referred to as 'haaji ' or ' hashya (25) indicates that they are in some sense regarded as sanctified. This is an illustration of the extent to which religion is identified with tribal structure among the northern nomads. We shall return to this point later. In the genealogies of the southern cultivating tribes (the Sab), however, such words tend to occur in the lower portions of tribal genealogies. Sometimes their occurrence indicates fairly feeble ties of attachment between adopting tribe and priestly section. In other cases where the attachment is more tenuous these titles represent extraneous aggregates often of long standing. As examples of dispersed clans of holy men we have already considered the Rer Sheik Mumin among the Rahanwiin and the Rer Au Qutub of British Somaliland. Both are typical representatives of this class. The Sheikal Lobogi section of the Herab tribe of Somalia are, on the other hand, a good example of a religious group or community firmly assimilated to the tribe of adoption (see genealogy above, p. 588). Sheik Lobogi, the eponymous ancestor of the group, is a descendant of Sheik Saad whose tomb is at Geledi in Somalia. Groups which have not achieved such firm integration in the tribal structure or assimilation in the lineage structure, are the Asheraf among the Saraman tribal cluster, (26) the Walamoji among the Elai, (27) and the Waaqbarre among the Dabarre tribe. The Asheraf rose to power in a manner typical of such groups, they acted as mediators in a series of disputes amongst the Saraman tribes which concluded in the expulsion of one, the Harau, and the division of another, the Lisan, into two new tribes, the Lisan Horsi and the Lisan Barre. At Saraman, the Asheraf are known as the ' Three Feet ' and take part in tribal councils as arbitrators and peace-makers. There are many religious clans known as Asheraf in Somaliland, and no doubt some of them derive ultimately from immigrant Ashraf. In view of the importance of Mogadishu as a centre in the diffusion of Islam it may well be that the Sharifs at present living in the Shangani quarter of Mogadishu who are of the Ba 'Alwi clan of Hadramaut,(28) and who settled in Somaliland in the 17th century, may constitute one of the original nuclei from which Ashraf blood has spread. The Walamoji wield considerable influence in Elai politics through the high prestige which they enjoy as men of religion. They claim to have accompanied the Elai in their wanderings before they reached their present territory, but they only recently became the official sheiks of the Elai after they had ousted another religious group - the 'Rer Fogi'. The founder is said to be of Galla Arussi origin, but as in the case of all religious sections they have vague traditions of descent from Quraysh which they exploit to the full. The Walamoji have considerable autonomy and are segmented into primary, secondary, and tertiary divisions (Colucci, 1991, p. 141). The Waaqbarre, who are attached to the Dabarre tribe, comprise three sections and have mixed traditions of connexion with the Galla Arussi and descent from a "Great Arabian Sheik". As is clear from the foregoing many tariqa communities degenerate into groups of wadaad (see above, p. 593) clustered round the shrine of their founder. Again there is the constant factor of the immigration of Arabian families of devouts and their Somali descendants who may have no direct affiliation with a particular tariqa. The complete picture is intricate and complex; it is not always possible to established the tariqa affiliations of religious groups with a Sufistic organization. Certainly it is often difficult to discover to which of the three - tariqa communities, shiekly families, or Arabian immigrants - particular names in tribal genealogies actually refer. There is no doubt that in many cases all are confused. They have in common an association with baraka. It seems, however, that apart from Arabian immigrants whose genealogies show connexion with Quraysh and consequently endowment with baraka are venerated in the same manner as Sufi saints and their cults are absorbed in the over-riding tariqa organization. It is with tariqa and jama'a that we are primarily concerned. The land necessary for the foundation of a jama'a is sometimes made readily accessible through the nomad's lack of interest in and contempt for cultivation. Often it was obtained as the result of skillful intervention in tribal disputes over land. Contested areas of arable land bordering tribal territory were ceded as astute sheiks who were thereby enabled to establish jama'as. At the same time the creation of these farming settlements contributed to the demarcation and definition of rigorous tribal boundaries (Lewis, 1955, pp. 43 ff., 143). Thus, for example, a chain of communities marking the principal watering-places and boundaries between tribes was set up along the Shebelle River from Afgoi to Mahaddei (Cerulli, 1923, p.26). For this reason it is appropriate to describe Sufi jama'as in southern Somalia as farming enclaves amongst tribes and occupying an interstitial territorial position analogous to their role in inter-tribal politics. The community's lands are acquired through adoption into a host tribe. Adoption within the tribal and lineage structure (if this is still functioning) places the head of the community and his followers in the initially inferior status of clients, subservient to the tribal elders and chief. At this stage the burden of the conflict between tribal custom (heer, tastuur on the one hand, and the Sharia on the other, seems to lie against the Sufi community. For the members of the jama'as are subject to conflicting loyalties. Islamic code which should rigorously govern their internal affairs cannot always be enforced in their relations with the tribesmen upon whom they are in dependence. Should tension between tribe and community reach a high pitch the community is in danger of losing its tenancy. However, such is the strength of tradition that in the hands of a wise sheik skilful in the maintenance of good relations with his tribe of adoption, tenancy easily lapses into ownership. Tenure has given rise to absolute possession. Rights to land may never be challenged, and the jama'a may achieve sufficient power to free itself completely from tribal allegiance. Such is the case of Bardera (above, p. 597). With the high premium which the increasing adoption of agriculture has caused to be set upon land, disputes over possession are common. But rivalry over land for cultivation is only one among many likely points at issue between a Sufi community and its tribe of adoption. In addition to the general disharmony between tribal custom and the Shari'a, the interference of sheiks in tribal politics, and the passing of religious leadership from tribe to jama'a, tribal sanctions would seem to be weakened by the asylum offered in jama'as to defaulters from tribal justice. At the same time a variety of factors encourage the growth of Sufi farming communities. The opportunities which a stable existence in agricultural settlements affords, together with the greater stability of tribal relations among the sedentary cultivators or only part-transhumant tribes of Somalia, attracts dispossessed people, many of whom are of servile origin, and promotes the further development of agriculture. The soil is favourable, there is administrative encouragement to cultivate - and many settlers are by nature cultivators - and the Shari'a, more thoroughly applied here, provides an essentially urban code whose juridical ordinances are more appropriate to farming settlements than they are to nomadic tribal society. All these factors are contributory to the disintegration of the lineage structure as well as to the formation of jama'a farms. It is not surprising then that there is a constant drift towards the religious settlements and away from the tribes: that it is no greater must be ascribed to the nomad's contempt of cultivation and those who practise it. When these factors are considered it is clear that there are many opportunities for friction between tribe and adopted community. In all disputes the procedure followed is the same: the tribe claiming the land occupied by the community seeks to abrogate the mandate by which it is alleged to have been ceded. The conflicts which ensue are usually resolved by the intervention of the administration. A typical example of the type of dispute which is likely to arise is the following: In 1920 the Hawadle claimed the land which the community of Burdere occupied and which it was maintained had been granted to the community 38 years previously. The tribe held that the grant had been only provisional and that the ground was now required for its own use, especially since several Hawadle families had already settled in the lands of the jama'a. Since the head of the jama'a continued to ignore their requests tribesmen continued to move into the community's lands without admission to the Order. The sheik was then moved to protest to the Italian Administration claiming that the disputed lands had been obtained not from the Hawadle but from an adjacent tribe, the Baddi Addo. The case was solved by the government's forcing those Hawadle who had illegally joined the community to withdraw after the harvest of their crops. Sufism triumphed and the community's rights were upheld against those of the tribe. The position of jama'as has further been strengthened by the administration's policy of appointing qadis from the ranks of Sufi brethren (wadaad) (Cerulli, 1973. pp. 28-29, 32-4). But government policy does not always seem to have been consistent on the side of the Orders and it has doubtless frequently turned disputes between tribes and religious Orders to its own advantage (29). We have noted how the differences in ecology between the northern terrain occupied by the nomads and the southern occupied by semi-nomadic and sedentary cultivators govern the territorial disposition of jama'as. There is naturally a much higher proportion of permanent Sufi settlements in the south than in the north, and consequently a higher proportion of autonomousb communities freed from tribal allegiance. In the south jama'as occupy an interstitial position in the social structure parallel to their territorial distribution. It is hardly surprising then that the communities are generally more closely intertwined in the lineage structure of the northern nomads than in what remains of that of the southern cultivators. The ecological differences between the north and south of Somaliland are reflected in the retention of the lineage organization among the nomads and the necessity for communities to maintain tribal affiliations in the north, while in the south where the lineage structure is in active disintegration communities tend to exist as independent settlements. GENEALOGIES ASSIMILATION We have seen how Quraysh is the symbol of divine grace and how the genealogies of Sufi sheiks and khalifas vaunt connexion with the Prophet's lineage. As we have also seen how in its client status, and thus at some point in the history of every jama'a, the community is identified with its head and with his genealogy. It is the incorporation of such genealogies, I believe, which leads ultimately to the inclusive ascription of the Somali nation to the Qurayshitic lineage of the Prophet. The Orders as they to-day exist in Somaliland do not date from before the 15th century (the time of the introduction of the Qadiriya) but it is unlikely that they could have assumed their present constitution and strength without some earlier proto-tariqa organization of the development of Sufism in Morocco, Drague, 1951, pp. 9-ll7). It appears probable, therefore, that the Qurayshitic pattern of Somali genealogies has developed in step - with the formal emergence of the Orders in Somaliland. We emphasized earlier, tariqas are not alone responsible for the introduction of Qurayshitic genealogies. Many of the immigrant Arabs who established chiefly dynasties among the Somali and who naturally brought their Arabian genealogies with them were doubtless not all Sufi. Some of them may indeed, have been the true descendants of Quraysh. Nevertheless, it is significant that the Somali celebrate as the authors of their faith and venerate as they do Sufi, saints, figures such as Sheiks Ishaaq and Daarood, who if not themselves historical personages are certainly the types of such. Sociologically it is apparent that the claim of descent from Quraysh is the necessary outcome of the application of the Somali lineage principle to the part played by Islam generally, and Sufism in particular, in the social structure. This consistency is made possible by the parallel functions of Sufi and Somali genealogies. That the nomads have stronger traditions of descent from Quraysh is to be expected, since, unlike the southern cultivators (Sab) whose arable lands facilitate the formation of autonomous independent Sufi communities, the jama'as of the northern nomads are seldom self-contained and are generally identified with the tribal structure. The same is genealogically true as we have seen. The closer genealogical assimilation among the nomadic population seems to explain why tribal families of the ' Soomaali ' group such as the Ishaaq and Daarood, as opposed to those of the ' Sab ', are referred to genealogically as though they represented vast Sufi communities. Such an interpretation is consistent with the role of Sufism among the Somali. The concluding sections of this essay (Part II), to be published in a later number of the Bulletin, win examine the religious assumptions which underlie this process of assimilation. Notes • I wish to acknowledge the help in the preparation of this paper which I have received from many scholars and to express my gratitude in particular to Ali Garaad Jama and Musa Haaji Isma'il Galaal of the British Somaliland Protectorate, to Mr. A. M. Abu Zaid, Mr. B. XV Andrzejewski, Dr. P. T. W. Baster, Professor E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Sir H. A. R. Gibb, Dr. G. Mathexv, and Professor R. B. Sergeant. • Orthography. In the transcription of Somali words I have wherever possible used the orthography of B. W. Andrzejewski as adopted by C. R. V. Bell in his work The Somali Language (Longmans), 1963. In this orthography vowel length is represented by doubling vowel letters, i.e. long a is written aa, etc. In some cases, however, I have had to adhere to the spellings given by my Italian authorities. Somali place-names, such as Mogadishu, are ' anglicized ' from the Italian. Arabic words are transliterated according to common usage, although certain words such as ' sheik ' which have well-known ' anglicized ' forms have been left in these forms. Thus the Prophet is referred to as ' Mohammed ', while in other proper names the transliteration 'Muhammad ' is given. • The same conclusion is reached by Drague in his masterly Esquisse d'Histoire Religieuse du Maroc, 1961, p. 8. • The authorities upon whose work this classification rests are cited in the Cushitic bibliography at the end of Part II of this paper. • By "Sufi genealogies" are meant, as indicated above, the personal genealogies of the sheikhs who are the founders and heads of the Somali Sufi Dervish Orders. • It is important to distinguish the ' Sab ' from the s outcast ' client peoples of Somaliland who have no independent tribal organization and do not own lands. These artisans and craftsmen have a clearly defined subject status and are written Sab (see Lewis, op. cit., pp. 51-5). It is not yet known whether Sab and Sab are linguistically identical or whether there are any ethnic connexions between the two peoples. • The Tunni are a tribal confederacy rather than a tribal family. • The Gedabuursi are of uncertain affiliation, they may belong to the Dir tribal family. • This division is, as Professor R. B. Sergeant has suggested to me, reminiscent of that between the northern and southern Arabs who trace descent from 'Adnan and Qahtan respectively. • Correctly as above indicated "Soomaali ". • Clients are called magan in the northern dialects; in the south 'arifa, and among the Digil, sheegad. • The extent of endogamy appears to vary from tribe to tribe, partly no doubt dependent upon size, and it is at present impossible to generalize definitively. • Contrast the classical definition of Ibn Khaldun, Prolegomenes, trs. de Slane, I, p. 382. • The generic word for any form of offering to God and for sacrifice in its widest sense is amongst the northern Somali Rabbibari, which Andrzejewski translates "beseeching God"; among the Hawiye of Somalia Waaq da'il "offering to the Sky God" is used according to Cerruli, op. cit. • Professor Sergeant's study of south Arabian ;MSS. has shown conclusively that the ' two great centres of diffusion of trade and the faith ' were Zeila and Mogadishu (personal communication). • Professor R. B. Sergeant, personal communication. • An account of his life is found in al-Shin;'s al-Mashra' al-Rawi (A.H. 1319, printed in the 'Amiryah Press), II, pp. 34-41. • Wadaad is the Somali equivalent of the ' marabout ' or ' mullah ', sometimes described as "hedge priest", found in all Muslim countries. His functions are manifold since as well a posted to The History of the Dir People.. at Sun Jan 01 11:02:01 EST 2006 by Agoon.

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